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ANTITRUST LAW - INSURANCE - INSURANCE COMPANY - PHAR-
MACY PROVIDER AGREEMENT Do NOT CONSTITUTE THE
"BUSINESS OF INSURANCE" UNDER THE MCCARRAN-FERGU-
SON ACT AND ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM FEDERAL ANTITRUST
SCRUTINY. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 99
S. Ct. 1067 (1979).
In Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,' a di-
vided United States Supreme Court held that pharmacy agreements
2
entered into by Blue Shield' and participating Texas pharmacies did
not constitute the "business of insurance"' within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act5 and were, therefore, not exempt from ex-
amination under the federal antitrust laws. 6 In reaching its conclu-
sion, the Court narrowed an immunity conferred on the insurance
industry by Congress following the landmark decision in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association7 in which the Court
held that the comprehensive language of the Sherman Act' applied
to the "business of insurance" as interstate commerce. 9
Respondents in Royal Drug, eighteen independent pharmacy
owners in San Antonio, Texas, brought suit against Blue Shield and
three pharmacy operators in federal district court,' 0 contending that
petitioners' retail price-fixing agreements'' for drugs and
I. 99 S. Ct. 1067 (1979).
2. See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
3. Group Life & Health Insurance Company was known as Blue Shield of Texas (Blue
Shield). 99 S. Ct. at 1071.
4. See note 15 infra.
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1976). See notes 15 and 17 infra, for the text of relevant
sections of the Act.
6. 99 S. Ct. at 1083-84. The Court, however, refused to speculate on the result of such
an examination and stressed that it did not hold the activities of petitioners illegal for antitrust
purposes, but viewed the issue as "an entirely separate question, not now before use." Id. at
1072. It was further noted that "lilt is axiomatic that conduct which is not exempt from the
antitrust laws may nevertheless be perfectly legal," a position reiterated by the Justice Depart-
ment's amicus brief, which indicated that the pharmacy agreements probably did not offend
the antitrust laws. Id at n.5.
7. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
8. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)).
9. 322 U.S. at 560-62.
10. 415 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
1I. An agreement fixing maximum prices is as much of an anathema to the antitrust laws
as the fixing of minimum prices. Though it may be argued that a ceiling on prices inures to the
public benefit, that same ceiling can quickly become a price floor. See, e.g., United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). "Under the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
pharmaceuticals violated section one of the Sherman Act.' 2 Under
these agreements participating pharmacies-consented to furnish pre-
scription drugs to Blue Shield's policyholders at two dollars for each
prescription, and Blue Shield contracted to reimburse the pharma-
cies for their acquisition costs for the drugs prescribed. 13 Respon-
dents alleged that as a result Blue Shield's policyholders did not
patronize respondents' businesses and that petitioners' actions thus
constituted an unlawful group boycott under the federal antitrust
laws. "4
the price . . . in interstate commerce is illegal per se." Id. at 223. See also Kiefer-Stewart Co.
v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (resale price maintenance).
The per se categorization evidences a judicial determination that certain practices have
such anticompetitive purposes and effects that a full factual analysis is not necessary because it
would sacrifice deterrence and increase the cost of judicial administration. Antitrust analysis
presently entails increased judicial interest in the facts of each case, even though the ultimate
finding may be that a per se offense exists. The list of per se restraints, which preclude detailed
factual considerations, is being narrowed. Millstein, Changing the Per Se Analysis in Counsel-
ing and Cases, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 25, 1978, at 22, col. 1. The current approach being used by the
courts has been summarized as follows:
The question is whether the particular restraint, in some ways similar to but in
other ways different from a classic per se offense, should be characterized as a per se
violation. In many cases, it is not possible to determine whether a particular business
practice should be characterized as a per se violation without conducting something
that looks suspiciously like the factual analysis that the per se rules are supposed to
avoid.
Id
12. Section I of the Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract, combination ...or
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Since the language of the Act indicates no limitation on its scope, literally applied, it could
invalidate most agreements. It was construed early in its history, however, as prohibiting only
unreasonable restraints on trade or commerce. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Though the pharmacy agreements in Royal Drug were express, inferences
of the existence of agreements will also be made from the circumstances. See, e.g., Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (numerous attorneys voluntarily following minimum
fee schedule adopted by county bar association and suggested by state bar association violated
§ I of the Sherman Act).
13. 99 S. Ct. at 1072. The Court found that the amicus curiae brief of the United States
provided a useful illustration of the operation of a pharmacy agreement. The following exam-
ple was supplied by the Justice Department:
Suppose the usual and customary retail price for a quantity of Drug X charged
both by "participating" Pharmacy A and "non-participating" Pharmacy B is $10.00,
and the wholesale price (or acquisition cost) to both is $8.00. If an insured buys Drug
X from Pharmacy A, the insured pays $2.00. Pharmacy A receives $2.00 from the
insured and $8.00 from Blue Shield, or $10.00 total. If an insured buys Drug X from
Pharmacy B, the insured pays Pharmacy B $10.00, and receives $6.00 (75 percent of
the difference between the retail price and $2.00) from Blue Shield. While Pharmacy
B receives the same as Pharmacy A, the insured must pay $4.00 for the drug and also
must take steps to obtain reimbursement.
If the pharmacy's acquisition cost for the drug is $5.00 rather than $8.00, the
situations of Pharmacy B and the insured are unchanged. But now Pharmacy A will
receive only $5.00 from Blue Shield, for a total of $7.00.
Id at n.3.
14. 99 S. Ct. at 1071.
Group boycotts or concerted refusals to deal are recognized as per se offenses under the
antitrust laws. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959), and
note 12 supra. Even though the group boycott is labeled as a per se violation, it is often treated
as being subject to the rule of reason. See McCormick, Group Boycotts - Per Se Or Not Per Se,
That Is The Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 703 (1976); Comment, Boycott: Specific Defini-
tion Limits the Applicability ofa Per Se Rule, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 818 (1977).
Among the well-known rule of reason cases are Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
The district court made four findings in deciding to dismiss the
case. It found that (1) petitioners' conduct constituted the "business
of insurance"; 5 (2) the state of Texas regulated the insurance indus-
try within the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act; 6 (3) the boy-
cott exception to the Act was inapplicable;' 7 and (4) the federal
antitrust laws were likewise inapplicable. Royal Drug appealed
from the grant of summary judgment to the United States Court of
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), and Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. I
(1911). Justice Brandeis' opinion in Chicago Board of Trade states the basic formulation of the
rule of reason analysis.
[Tihe legality of an agreement or regulation cannot be determined by so simple a test,
as whether it restrains competition. Every agreement concerning trade, every regula-
tion of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence. The true test of
legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopt-
ing the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant
facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regu-
lation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.
246 U.S. at 238.
The Court recently delineated the contours of the rule of reason by stating, "Contrary to
its name, the Rule does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any argument in favor of a
challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason. Instead, it focuses directly on the
challenged restraint's impact on competitive conditions." National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (ethical canon prohibiting competitive bid-
ding by engineering society members held violative of the Sherman Act).
15. Section 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in relevant part, "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State
for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). An
exception to this rule was that after June 30, 1948, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976);
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976); and Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41-
58 (1976), would apply to the "business of insurance" "to the extent that such business
[was] not regulated by State Law." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
This antitrust exemption has been termed "a prime candidate for interpretive contro-
versy." Rosdeitcher, Recent Judicial Interpretations of the McCarran Act Antitrust Exemption,
13 FORUM 873-874 (1978). Its effect was to inform the states that they could preclude applica-
tion of the antitrust laws to the business of insurance by enacting state regulatory legislation
during the moratorium period ending June 30, 1948. Id. at 875. Such state regulation, how-
ever, could not save boycotts from federal antitrust scrutiny. See note 17 infra.
In addition, especially considering the trend of recent decisions, questions arise on
whether states have sufficiently "regulated" the business of insurance to invoke federal anti-
trust immunity. Rosdeitcher, supra, at 877. A decision that closely scrutinized and delineated
the degree of state regulation for federal antitrust purposes was Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,
428 U.S. 579 (1976). For an extensive analysis of that case, see Comment, The State Action
Exemption in Antitrust.- From Parker P. Brown to Cantor P. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DUKE L.J.
871.
16. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § I (Vernon 1963). The express purpose of the
state statute was "to regulate trade practices in the business of insurance in accordance with
the intent of Congress as expressed in the [McCarran-Ferguson] Act . . . by defining, or pro-
viding for the determination of, all such practices in this state which constitute unfair methods
of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices and by prohibiting the trade practices so
defined or determined." Id
17. The boycott exception defined in § 3(b) of the original McCarran-Ferguson Act has
survived intact in the present version: "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott,
coercion or intimidation." 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976)..
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 8 The court of appeals reversed, find-
ing that Blue Shield's pharmacy.agreement plan was not part of the
"business of insurance" even though some effect on rates and policy-
holders might result and that, therefore, the federal antitrust laws
were applicable. 9 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certio-
rari to resolve the intercircuit conflicts on the meaning of "business
of insurance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.20
The McCarran-Ferguson Act marked a congressional attempt
to partially restore the tradition begun in Paul v. Virginia2 1 that
"[ilssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce, "22
but instead a local transaction within the exclusive domain of the
states.2 3 The Paul doctrine was expanded in the Hooper v. Califor-
nia24 decision that the insurance business in general, like an isolated
policy sale, was not commerce within the meaning of the commerce
clause.25 Congressional action to restore the traditional approach
was necessary because the Court's holding in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association "left a major segment of the econ-
omy in a disquieting state of uncertainty. ' 26 The McCarran-Fergu-
son Act was the direct response to this decision,27 as Congress
endeavored to enact legislation that would preserve state power to
tax and regulate the business of insurance.28
The Act limited federal regulation and provided for application
of the antitrust laws only if insurance company activities were not
18. 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977). See 415 F. Supp. at 347-50.
19. 556 F.2d at 1387.
20. 99 S. Ct. at 1071-72. The Fifth Circuit's position differed from that of the Third,
Fourth, and D.C. Circuits. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Frankford Hosp. v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977); Anderson v.
Medical Serv. of D.C., 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977).
21. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869). For more than seventy-five years following that deci-
sion, many practices clearly violative of the Sherman and Clayton Acts developed in the insur-
ance industry. Most notable among these practices was concerted ratemaking, which, absent
the commerce exemption, would have been punished. Rosdeitcher, supra note 15, at 875.
22. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 183.
23. Id
24. 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
25. Id at 655.
26. Comment, Policyholder Standing Under the Boycott Exception to the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, 10 U. CONN. L. REV. 419, 423 (1972). See E. SAWYER, INSURANCE AS INTER-
STATE COMMERCE 3 (1945).
27. See generally FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 299-302 (1960); 91
CONG. REC. 1085-93, 1478-86 (1945); SAWYER, supra note 26, at 50-51.
The South-Eastern Underwriters Association was comprised of nearly two hundred fire
insurance companies and twenty-seven individuals that collectivel controlled 90% of the fire
insurance business in six states. 322 U.S. at 534-35. Among the alleged Sherman Act viola-
tions were fixing of premiums and agents' commissions and threatening policyholders of non-
member companies with withdrawal of all Association services. Id at 535-36.
28. 99 S. Ct. at 1076 n.16. This was the primary concern of Congress; the applicability of
the antitrust laws was a secondary consideration. Id. at n. 18. Even before the South-Eastern
Underwriters decision, Congress had examined proposals to exempt the insurance industry
from the Clayton and Sherman Acts and within three weeks of the decision the House of
Representatives approved a-blanket exemption bill. Id at 1076-77. See 90 CONG. REC. 6565.
(1944).
the "business of insurance" and were not regulated by state law.2 9
Moreover, the Sherman Act was made applicable without restriction
only to acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation.3" A three-year
moratorium ending July 1, 1948, allowed states a respite during
which to adjust to the new Act.3 ' The legislative history of the Act
shows that Congress clearly neither intended to, nor did, overrule the
South-Eastern Underwriters decision, but that the "business of insur-
ance" was the underwriting and spreading of risk and that, therefore,
only this activity was exempt from federal antitrust scrutiny.32
The Royal Drug Court began by citing with approval its posi-
tion in Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,3 3 that "the
starting point in a case involving construction of the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act, like the starting point in any case involving the meaning
of a statute, is the language of the statute itself."' 34 The majority im-
mediately distinguished between application of the antitrust exemp-
tion to the "business of insurance" rather than to the "business of
insurers."35  Since the argument that the Act conferred state
supremacy in the regulation of all insurance company activities had
earlier been rejected, 36 the Court's task in Royal Drug was determin-
ing whether the pharmacy agreements were "within the ordinary un-
derstanding of. . .[the] phrase ['business of insurance'], illumined
by any light to be found in the structure of the Act and its legislative
history."37
In reaching a negative determination, the Court focused on both
treatises and case law to confirm that the essential elements of an
insurance contract are underwriting and spreading risk, elements
that were adjudged absent from the pharmacy agreements. While
the Royal Drug petitioners argued that the pharmacy agreements did
underwrite risks, the Court found their position fallacious in that it
confused Blue Shield's obligations to its policyholders under the
29. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976). This is § 2(b) of the Act. See note 15 supra.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b) (1976). This is § 3(b) of the Act. See note 17 supra.
31. 91 CONG. REC. 1443 (1945) (remarks of Senators McCarran and Ferguson). See
McCarran, Federal Control of Insurance." Moratorium Under Public Law 15 Expired July 1, 34
A.B.A.J. 539, 539-40 (1948). See also 91 CONG. REC. 478 (1945) [exchange between Senators
McKellar and Ferguson); 91 CONG. REC. 1444 (1945) (exchange between Senators Pepper and
McCarran).
32. 99 S. Ct. at 1078.
33. 438 U.S. 531 (1978). The Barry Court agreed with the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit that a valid antitrust boycott claim existed when three medical mal-
practice insurers agreed not to deal with the fourth's policyholder physicians so that the
insureds would be compelled to accept a reduced form of coverage.
34. 99 S. Ct. at 1073.
35. Id
36. See SEC v. National Sec. Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969). In that case a merger of
two insurance companies was held not to be the "business of insurance." Since the statute was
not enacted to regulate the "business of insurance," federal antitrust examination was permis-
sible even though the Arizona Director of Insurance had approved the merger pursuant to
statute. Id at 460.
37. 99 S. Ct. at 1073.
drug policies with its agreements with the participating pharmacies.
The policies insured the risk that policyholders would not be able to
pay for prescription drugs, and Blue Shield promised to pay all costs
above the two dollar drug deductible, which made policyholders in-
different about the pharmacy agreements. The majority opinion
viewed these agreements as "merely arrangements for the purchase
of goods and services by Blue Shield ' 38 and found, as had the court
of appeals, that "by minimizing costs and maximizing profits . . .
[they] inure[d] principally to the benefit of Blue Shield."39 Though
the Court did not dispute that arrangements between the participat-
ing pharmacies and Blue Shield might be sound business practice,
any arguable benefit to policyholders in the form of premium reduc-
tions was not sufficient to distinguish the pharmacy agreements from
"countless other business arrangements that may be made by insur-
ance companies to keep their costs low and thereby also keep low the
level of premiums charged to their policyholders."4
The opinion also discussed the contractual insured-insurer rela-
tionship, referred to as "[alnother commonly understood aspect of
the business of insurance."'" The Court rejected Blue Shield's argu-
ment that while the pharmacy agreements were not between Blue
Shield and its policyholders, they, nevertheless, fell within the ex-
emption because of their influence on the reliability of the insurance
contract. Instead the Court found that this erroneous interpretation
would protect almost every decision of an insurance company from
federal antitrust scrutiny, "a result . . . plainly contrary to the statu-
tory language, which exempts the 'business of insurance' and not the
'business of insurance companies.' "42
The Court's discussion in Royal Drug of the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act emphasized that cooperative ratemaking efforts were in-
tended to be exempt from the antitrust laws "[blecause of the
widespread view that it is very difficult to underwrite risks in an in-
formed and responsible way without intraindustry cooperation."43
The final version of the Act was based largely on a bill suggested by
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), but
38. Id. at 1074.
39. 555 F.2d at 1381.
40. 99 S. Ct. at 1075. The Court indicated that Blue Shield's agreements constituted the
"business of insurance" no more than would an insurance company's contract with a large
retail drug chain to require policyholders to buy drugs only from that chain or a company's
acquisition of a drug store chain in order to lower costs of paying policyholder claims. Id.
41. Id
42. Id. at 1076. The Court did recognize the correctness of the SEC v. National Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969), holding that peripheral activities of insurance companies exist
that are so closely related to the companies' status as reliable insurers that such activities also
qualify for the "business of insurance" exemption. The proper focus, nevertheless, continues
to be on the insurance company-policyholder relationship. 99 S. Ct. at 1075-76.
43. Id at 1078.
Congress rejected a proposal of seven enumerated exclusions from
the Sherman Act.' Noting that the remarks of Senators both during
the floor debates and otherwise focused on a cooperative ratemaking
exemption the Court opined that "[tihere is not the slightest sugges-
tion in the legislative history that Congress in any way contemplated
that arrangements such as the Pharmacy Agreements in this case,
which involve the mass purchase of goods and services from entities
outside the insurance industry, are the 'business of insurance.' "'
As further support for its position, the majority noted that when
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed, corporations organized to
provide medical services and hospitalization for their members, such
as Blue Shield, were considered neither engaged in the "business of
insurance" nor subject to state insurance laws.46 Moreover, such or-
ganizations themselves have historically sought to avoid state regula-
tion and taxation by arguing against being classified as insurance
companies.47 Thus, the Court found it "next to impossible to assume
that Congress could have thought that agreements (even by insur-
ance companies) which provide for the purchase of goods and serv-
ices from third parties at a set price are within the meaning of.
[the] phrase ['business of insurance']. 48
Finally the majority reiterated the principle that "exemptions
from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed, ' 49 whether they
are implicit or express statutory exemptions.5" The Royal Drug
44. Id See 90 CONG. REC. A4403-08 (1944). These specific practices all included intra-
industry cooperation or concerted activities. "None involved contractual arrangements that
insurance companies might make with providers of goods or services to reduce the costs to the
companies of meeting their underwriting obligations to their policyholders." 99 S. Ct. at 1078.
45. 99 S. Ct. at 1079-80. The dissent found other reasons for the lack of discussion of
provider agreements. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text infra. The majority, neverthe-
less, indicated that such agreements were not among the NAIC's suggested exemptions. 99 S.
Ct. at 1079 n.30. See 90 CONG. REC. A4406 (1944).
46. 99 S. Ct. at 1080. See, e.g., Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.
1939); California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946); Commis-
sioner of Bank Ins. v. Community Health Serv., 129 N.J.L. 427, 30 A.2d 44 (1943).
In Jordan v. Group Health the nonprofit corporation that provided medical benefits to
members in return for a fixed annual premium contracted with physicians, hospitals, etc. in
order to obtain lower prices than if each member contracted separately. The circuit court
concluded that Group Health's activities of getting services to its members identified it as a
consumer cooperative with functions separate from those of insurance or indemnity compa-
nies, the principal, if not exclusive, concern of which was risk. 107 F.2d at 247.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 1082. See Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Actr Antitrust Exemption for
Insurance. Language, History, and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 624 n.174. One commentator
noted that though insurance experts have often expressed amazement at the arguments of the
"Blues" (Blue Cross and Blue Shield), many courts have sided with the companies' position.
Denenberg, The Legal Defnition of Insurance, 30 J. INS. 319, 322 (1963).
48. 99 S. Ct. at 1082.
49. Id at 1083. See, e.g., Abbott Labs v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1
(1976) (Nonprofit Institutions Act); Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local
Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (National Labor Relations Act); Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726 (1973) (§ 15 of the Shipping Act); United States
v. McKesson & Robbins, 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts).
50. 99 S. Ct. at 1083.
Court held application of the principle "particularly appropriate...
because the Pharmacy Agreements involve[d] parties wholly outside
the insurance industry."'" The Court also noted "that an exempt
entity forfeits antitrust exemption by acting in concert with nonex-
empt parties."52 The danger in finding that the pharmacy agree-
ments constituted the "business of insurance" because of their cost-
reducing features lay in the potential validation of all cost control
agreements insurers might make. The Court, therefore, affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals that Congress did not exempt the
"business of insurers" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, but ex-
empted only the "business of insurance.""
Mr. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which he
stated that the pharmacy agreements should be considered part of
the "business of insurance."54 As did the majority, he felt it impor-
tant to examine the background of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, but
took issue with the view that the lack of congressional discussion
about insurer-third party provider agreements established by nega-
tive inference their exclusion from the "business of insurance." The
dissent relied instead on the general language of the Act to support a
broad exemption and cited language from SEC v. National Securities,
Inc. 55 that the legislative history of the Act does not elucidate on the
meaning of "business of insurance. '"56
The dissent did not dispute the majority's view that continuing
state regulation of insurance as it existed prior to South-Eastern Un-
derwriters was Congress' motive in enacting the federal insurance
law nor did it reject the relevance of considering what the states in
1945 viewed and regulated as insurance. Logically, however, the
majority agreed with the Court's statement in SEC v. VariableAnnu-
ity Life Insurance Co., 57 that "insurance is an evolving institution
. . . the forms [of which] have greatly changed even in a genera-
tion. The dissent contended, however, that a determination of the
scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act required not only an analysis
of the proximity between challenged transactions and those recog-
51. Id
52. Id See, e.g., Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302 (1971) (union forfeits its antitrust ex-
emption if it agrees with one group of employers to impose a wage scale on other bargaining
units); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967) (exempt agricultural
cooperative under Capper-Volstead Act loses exemption when it conspires with nonexempt
parties).
53. 99 S. Ct. at 1083-84. The Court perceived serious anticompetitive consequences if it
exempted the provider agreements and cited recent studies indicating that physicians and
other health care providers dominated Blue Shield plan boards of directors, leading to rapid
escalation of health care costs. Id at 1083-84 n.40.
54. Id at 1084.
55. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
56. 99 S. Ct. at 1084. See 393 U.S. at 459.
57. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
58. Id at 71.
nized as elements of insurance but also an examination of the histor-
ical setting of the Act. The minority's conclusion was that Blue
Shield's pharmacy agreements enjoyed the status of the "business of
insurance" under both counts.59
The "common ground" of both the majority and minority was
agreement that the policy between Blue Shield and its insureds un-
questionably constituted the "business of insurance."6 ° Even though
policies expressly providing drug benefits were unavailable during
the 1930's and 1940's, analogous noncash payment policies provid-
ing hospital and medical services existed.6' Moreover, state regula-
tion of service-benefit plans was widely in effect by the time the Act
was passed,62 and the plans themselves were a commonly recognized
form of insurance.63 Congress adopted an enabling act for such a
plan in the District of Columbia in 19396 and in 1946 referred to
Blue Shield type programs as "insurance" in debates on these plans
as an alternative to national health insurance.65 Thus, the dissent
urged that "[t]he status of service-benefit policies as 'insurance,' both
logically and historically, . . . sufficiently established .. .the first
premise in an analysis of the status of the Pharmacy Agreements at
issue in this case."66
After determining that service-benefit plans were "insurance,"
the minority opinion addressed the question of "whether at least
some contracts with third parties to procure delivery of benefits to
Blue Shield's insureds would also constitute the 'business of insur-
ance.' "67 The majority's absolute refusal to classify the challenged
provider agreements as such was viewed as erroneous and unsup-
ported by previous decisions of the Court and the legislative history
59. 99 S. Ct. at 1086-87.
60. Id at 1087. Of no consequence was the difference between Blue Shield's payments to
its insureds in goods and services and the first health insurance companies' payments in cash.
Id
61. Id The hospital benefit concept dates from 1929; medical services began to be offered
in 1939. R. EILERS, REGULATION OF BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS 15 (1963). Over
twenty million people were enrolled in service-benefit plans, which comprised 61% of the hos-
pitalization insurance market, when the McCarran-Ferguson Act was passed. A National
Health Program, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Education and Labor, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 173 (1946).
62. 99 S. Ct. at 1087. Before 1939, twenty-four states had enabling acts that expressly
subjected service-benefit plans to state insurance department regulation. See Rorem, Enabling
Legislation for Non-Profit Hospital Service Plans, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 528, 531-32
(1939); Comment, Group Health Plans.- Some Legal and Economic Aspects, 53 YALE L.J. 162,
174 (1943). By the time the Act was passed, thirty-five states had enabling legislation. F.
HEDINGER, THE SOCIAL ROLE OF BLUE CROSS AS A DEVICE FOR FINANCING THE COSTS OF
HOSPITAL CARE 51 (1966). The Royal Drug dissent listed these states. See 99 S. Ct. at 1087
n.6 and 1088 n.7.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 1088.
64. See H.R. 6266, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939); H.R. Rep. No. 1247, 76th Cong., ist Sess.
(1939); 84 CONG. REC. 11224 (1939).
65. A National Health Program, supra note 61, at 55, 83, 108, 172, 558.
66. 99 S. Ct'. at 1089.
67. Id
of the Act. Specifically, the dissent noted that underwriting of risk
has not always been deemed an indispensable characteristic of the
"business of insurance."68 The dissent emphasized Congress' knowl-
edge of service-benefit policies as insurance and stressed that com-
mon sense mandated a conclusion that Congress viewed contracts
necessary to effectuate those policies as within the "business of insur-
ance" category.69
After arguing that some provider agreements constituted the
"business of insurance," Justice Brennan's final concern was whether
the agreements in question met the test. Respondents urged a nega-
tive answer in accordance with the court of appeals holding and in-
dicated that though the payment of a set amount (here two dollars)
to the druggists might be proper and necessary, the freeze on the
markup and limiting of reimbursement to acquisition costs was
price-fixing, an anticompetitive practice that was not the "business of
insurance."7 Citing historical precedent,7' the dissent rejected re-
spondents' contentions and regarded anticompetitiveness as irrele-
vant because "[a]n antitrust exemption by its very nature must
protect some transactions that are anticompetitive; an exemption
that is extinguished by a finding that challenged activity violates the
antitrust laws is no exemption at all."72
Several reasons were found by the dissent to support the inclu-
sion of the challenged provider agreements within the circle of ex-
emptions. First, the contractual arrangement did affect costs and,
therefore, both rate-setting and insurer reliability. 73 The unnecessa-
rily high correlation between rates and drug prices in a drug-benefits
policy illustrated the more than incidental connection between the
contract, policy, and premium. Thus, the minority found that Blue
Shield's pharmacy agreements had sufficient nexus to basic insur-
ance elements to be considered the "business of insurance." Second,
68. Id See, e.g., FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958) (advertising of insurance
is within scope of the McCarran-Ferguson Act). In addition, various horizontal arrangements
between insurers were non-risk spreading but constituted, nevertheless, the "business of insur-
ance," a concession the majority made despite "failure to fit within ...[the risk-spreading]
formula." 99 S. Ct. at 1089.
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1090-91. The dissent further opined,
Some kind of provider agreement becomes a necessity if a service-benefits in-
surer is to meet its obligations to the insureds. The policy before us in this case, for
example, promises payment of benefits in drugs. Thus, some arrangement must be
made to provide those drugs for subscribers. Such an arrangement obtains the very
benefits promised in the policy; it does not simply relate to the general operation of
the company ....
Id
70. Id at 1091.
71. According to the dissent, early service-benefit plans fixed more of the payment to
participating providers then did the Royal Drug markup fixing. Id at 1091-92.
72. Id at 1092.
73. ld SEC v. National Sec. Inc. recognized this effect as relevant to the "business of
insurance" determination. See 393 U.S. at 460.
the agreements exemplified legitimate efforts to reduce the unpre-
dictable aspects of the risk assumed, specifically by advance con-
tracting for a price in order to minimize the "pay ofl" variable due to
market fluctuations.74 The court of appeals had recognized the risk
of bankruptcy for service-benefit plans that paid costs regardless of
their amount, but recommended periodic rate structure adjustment
to reflect inflation as a solution to the problem.75
The dissent recognized the necessity of a case-by-case approach
to the "business of insurance" problem, though the minority felt that
the concept of provider agreements for benefits promised in a serv-
ice-benefit policy was necessary to accomplish the duties under such
a policy. Nonetheless, the dissenting opinion acknowledged that all
provider agreements would not qualify as the "business of insur-
ance" under the McCarran-Ferguson Act proviso.7 6 The ultimate
recommendation was that reversal and remand were necessary since
the court of appeals had not decided whether petitioners' actions
were state regulated or if they fell within the boycott exception.
77
The Royal Drug decision is not surprising in view of present
interest in increased federal regulation of the insurance industry.78
Its effect is to erode the almost complete immunity the enterprise has
enjoyed from federal antitrust suit. Until recently, for example, the
boycott exception, though broadly worded, has been consistently in-
terpreted narrowly to apply only to intra-industry blacklisting.79
Therefore, consumers have not enjoyed the protection that the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act could provide and have been forced to rely on
ineffective state legislation.8"
Present indications are that time may be running out for the
insurance antitrust shield, for the 96th Congress will undoubtedly
consider changes in the Act. Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Royal Drug Co. thus reinforces a trend toward antitrust scrutiny of
the insurance industry, "the last key sector of the national economy
generally free of federal regulation."'"
74. 99 S. Ct. at 1093.
75. 556 F.2d at 1382.
76. 99 S. Ct. at 1093-94.
77. Id. at 1095. See note 17 supra.
78. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
79. Blacklisting refers to the coercive practice by groups of insurance companies against
other insurers. Members of the group direct agents not to write policies in the name of compa-
nies on the "list" and threaten agents with loss of their agency unless they obey the directive.
Comment, supra note 26, at 419 n.5 (1978).
80. Id at 419.
81. Hallett, Is Time Running Out on the Insurance Industry?, Legal Times of Washington,
Mar. 2, 1979, at 14, col. 1. [Casenote by Mary Pauline Finan]

